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ABSTRACT 'NTEREY CA 93943-5101
In recent years, the United States Navy has actively sought new and better ways of making
the recruiting process more efficient. Towards this end, the Production Recruiting Incentive
Model (PRIME) was developed at the Naval Postgraduate School.
This Thesis evaluates recruiter production and incentives in the Navy's quota-based
recruiting system against the PRIME system using Monte Carlo simulation techniques in two
spreadsheet models. The first spreadsheet model compares three distinct quota scenarios against
PRIME in three separate recruit market conditions. The second model evaluates the two systems
as the variance of the recruit market changes.
This study produces two main findings. First, in all cases, PRIME proves to be a superior
recruiting system than its quota-based rival. Second, the simulation quantitatively illustrates the
inherent flaws of quota-based recruiting. The author recommends that the Navy replace the
current quota-based system with the more efficient PRIME system.
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The Production Recruiting Incentive Model (PRIME) was
first developed in 1993 by Professor Katsuaki Terasawa of
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) . Originally called the
Bonus Recruiting Incentive Model, PRIME is a system that
incentivizes recruiters to achieve their maximum production
levels
.
Although it complements the work of former NPS masters
students who have explored ways of introducing PRIME into
the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) , this
thesis has taken a new direction. This thesis looks at the
Naval Recruiting Command to determine whether PRIME is more
efficient and effective in accessing new recruits than the
current quota system.
B . OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate whether the
PRIME system is a more efficient recruiting system than the
Navy's current quota-based system by using Monte Carlo
computer simulation techniques. This thesis will focus on
whether individual and aggregate levels of production
increase, under given market conditions, when a PRIME system
replaces a quota system. It will also evaluate individual
recruiter incentive levels attained using both systems under
identical market conditions. Finally, it will evaluate both
systems as the market conditions change.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary research question
Will productivity of Navy recruiters increase when
using the PRIME system vice the current quota-based system?
2. Secondary research questions
a. Will adopting the PRIME system increase long-
term efficiencies in the overall recruiting process as
current and reliable information becomes available?
b. What effect would an increase in the variance
of the recruiting market have on the performance of PRIME as
compared to a quota-based system?
c. What would be the effect on the overall
recruiting effort of commands establishing quotas to insure
a high probability of mission attainment, and how would this
then compare with PRIME?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis will assess the PRIME system as it applies
to enlisted recruiting practices in the United States Navy.
It will examine studies implementing PRIME within the USAREC
during its research. This thesis will not address officer
accessions or any tailored recruiting practices of the
Navy's specialty corps, such as the Religious Services,
Legal Services, or Medical Service communities. It uses
standard data analysis and Monte Carlo techniques in running
the computer simulation.
E . METHODOLOGY
This thesis begins by reviewing literature, theses, and
other studies conducted in recent years concerning
recruiting incentives, quota-based recruiting systems, and
the PRIME system. It identifies advantages and
disadvantages with the two systems. Next, a PRIME model is
constructed and used in computer simulation to evaluate
PRIME against different permutations of a quota-based
incentive system. This thesis compares production and
recruiter incentive levels using computer-generated
normalized market data in each of the permutations. The
analysis also uses Monte Carlo simulation techniques to
compare the two systems while altering the variance of the
market data.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter I provides a general introduction to this
thesis, including scope and limitations, methodology, and
thesis organization.
Chapter II provides relevant background information,
including the findings from the 1994 General Accounting
Office (GAO) report. It summarizes research conducted by
the RAND Corporation and the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) , issues established by the Department of the Navy
Organization, Management and Infrastructure Team (DONOMIT)
,
and recent theses written on PRIME and quota-based systems
at the Naval Postgraduate School
.
Chapter III describes the current quota-based system,
including the organization of the Naval Recruiting Command
(NRC) , the types of recruiters, and the accession process.
It also examines the advantages and disadvantages of the
quota system.
Chapter IV examines the PRIME system. It includes a
detailed discussion of the truth-telling mechanism behind
the system, as well as advantages and disadvantages of the
model
.
Chapter V discusses the computer simulation, including
a walk-through of the model, parameter development and
underlying assumptions.
Chapter VI analyzes the simulation results.
Chapter VII provides final conclusions and
recommendations, including suggestions for further research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides relevant background information
to the study. After a general historical overview of the
success of military recruiting, this chapter examines a 1994
General Accounting Office (GAO) report presented to Congress
on the effectiveness and efficiency of military recruiting.
The chapter then reviews studies conducted by the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the RAND Corporation
which discussed recruiter performance, recruiter incentives,
and quota systems. Next, the chapter presents research
undertaken by former NPS masters students that address the
PRIME system or offer conclusions on the viability of quota-
based systems. It concludes with a short discussion of the
Department of the Navy Organization, Management and
Infrastructure Team (DONOMIT) "laundry list" presented to
NPS in July 1997. The analysis issues addressed by this
group underscore the immediacy and urgency for exploring
innovative approaches to the Navy's recruiting process.
The PRIME system is presented in light of this
background and current political climate.
B . GENERAL
Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States
military has been an all-volunteer force. As such, each of
the military services have established huge recruiting force
structures and have developed many comprehensive processes
and systems to entice young men and women through their
doors. These recruiting organizations have had varying
degrees of success in the past quarter century. At the
onset, the services were generally successful bringing in
volunteers. Towards the end of the 1970' s, however, they
only achieved 90% of their goals. Congress acted quickly to
offer incentives to potential enlistees, including signing
bonuses and funding for advanced education. By the mid
1980' s, the military recruiters were back on track. In
fact, by 1986 all services were at or above their accession
goals; recruit quality was at an all-time high.
The end of the Cold War brought down- sizing to the
Department of Defense (DOD) ; with it came reductions in the
recruiting industry. Budget levels for recruiting active
enlisted personnel dropped from $1.6 billion in 1986 (in
constant 1994 dollars) to $1.1 billion in 1994, a drop of
almost 31 percent. (GAO, 1994, p. 15)
The size of the recruiting force changed as well.
Services cut their recruiter forces by 10% across the board
between 1992 and 1994. This cut was in response to
congressional direction. The Navy cuts were a bit more
severe than the rest of the services, as illustrated by
their initial 17 percent decrease in recruiting personnel
.
(GAO', 1994, pp. 34-35)
The recruiting budget and recruiter force were not the
only things to fall. This period of military downsizing was
accompanied by a decrease in the propensity for young adults
to enlist in the services. Between 1989 and 1992, the
positive propensity to enlist among young adult males fell
from 32 percent of the population to 26.6 percent.
Recruiting experts in the services attributed this 17%
drop to a variety of reasons, including a decrease in
advertising funds, a public perception about the dangers of
military service, as well as a belief that budget cuts make
the services an unstable career choice. Whatever the cause,
the resulting recruiting climate involves fewer recruiters,
working with smaller budgets, finding customers who are more
disillusioned than ever before. (GAO, 1994, p. 27)
The austere recruiting climate was particularly
troublesome for the Navy. Pry (1996) observes that from
fiscal year (FY) 1990 to FY 1995, the Naval Recruiting
Command made its overall accession target in only four of
six years. Furthermore, the percentage of recruiting
districts that met their directed goals fell from 65% in FY
1990 to less than 20% in FY 1995. His findings are
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Figure 2-1
Mission Success Rate For NRC Districts
(Source: Pry, 1996 p. 22)
G. GAO REPORT
In response to a request from Senator David Pryor, D-
AK, the GAO published a December 1994 study of military
recruiting operations. This study identified areas where
the DOD could reduce its recruiting costs without adversely
affecting its ability to meet military personnel
requirements. The GAO report found that the quota system
artificially constrains the total number of potential
enlistees a recruiter can sign to contracts. Overproduction
is not rewarded and, in fact, could be negatively reinforced
through an increase in future assigned quotas.
A higher quota in subsequent periods is bad for two
reasons. First, it increases the recruiter's workload with
no change in production deadlines. Second, it increases the
possibility of not attaining the quota, which could have
further negative consequences. The recruiters' performance
evaluations are usually tied directly to their ability to
make their quota. It is entirely possible, in the current
recruiting system, that overproduction could be a career-
damaging mistake. GAO thusly concluded that the effects of
the quota system, coupled with historical performance data,
suggest that current recruiter production levels could be
higher (GAO, 1994, p. 36)
.
The study also found that the "DOD may not be
maximizing the cost-effectiveness of its recruiting
resources." One specific area that stood out was the
geographic dispersion of its 6,000 recruiting offices
throughout the country. Noting that "50 percent of these
offices provide just 13.5 percent of the recruits," GAO
recommended further study of how the military allocates its
resources. (GAO, 1994, p. 3)
GAO further noted that the services shrank the size of
the recruiting force in response to congressional direction
in 1992. However, some of the services, including the Navy,
plan to increase the force in the near future to meet
recruiting goals. GAO disagreed with this increase.
Rather, it concluded that the relationship between
accessions and recruiters cannot be determined due to the
quota system (GAO, 1994 p. 36) . It recommended that the
services "revalidate the recruiting quota systems, which
currently deter recruiters from maximizing the numbers of
enlistments" (GAO, 1994, p. 53)
.
D. RAND CORPORATION STUDIES
The RAND Corporation has published studies that have
attacked the viability of quota-based incentive systems.
Dertouzos (1985) , one of the first to analyze how the quota
system negatively affects recruiters' incentives, reached
conclusions that were almost identical to those of GAO
almost a decade later. He stated:
Although recruiter success and subsequent promotion depends on
production relative to quota allocations, the rewards for overproduction
may not, for a variety of reasons, be sufficient to induce maximum effort at
all times Indeed preliminary evidence suggests that there may even exist
disincentives to produce. (Dertouzos, 1985, p. 15)
Asch conducted several studies of the quota-based
incentive programs, looking all the way back to the
initiation of the Freeman Plan in the 1970' s. She concluded
that these incentive programs are not bringing about the
desired recruiter behavior. As the recruiters "game" the
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incentive system, they are not maximizing productivity.
(Asch, 1990, pp. iii-ix)
Orvis and Asch (1997) analyzed recent recruiting trends
and their implications. They concluded that recruiter
effectiveness in accessing recruits has declined and that
this trend is likely to continue for the near future. They
recommended increasing recruiting resources to meet
accession requirements. Additionally, they recommended
rethinking recruiting management to "seek ways to enhance
cost-effectiveness of recruiting in a post-drawdown
environment." (Orvis and Asch, 1997, pp. 43-48)
E. CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES STUDIES
The Center for Naval Analyses has conducted many
studies into the field of recruiting that complement the
GAO ' s conclusions. For example, Cymrot (1995) studied
recruit quality and attrition trends in the Navy. Although
he did not focus on incentive issues, he did analyze how
resource allocation effects the degree to which new recruits
attrite . He acknowledged that, given the present way of
doing business in today's recruiting environment "with
limited resources, a high recruiting requirement may not be
achievable." (Cymrot, 1995, p. 1) This implies that the
current allocation of resources can adversely affect the
Navy's recruiting process. If the allocation process could
be improved, the overall recruiting effort would benefit.
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Cooke has published several studies in the past decade
on the Delayed Entry Program, seasonal recruiting patterns,
first-term attrition, and the Success Chances for Recruits
Entering the Navy (SCREEN) program. A general theme
throughout all of his work is that a favorable recruiting
environment is directly related to a favorable retention
environment. (Cooke, 1988, p. 34)
The correlation between the recruiting environment and
retention underscores the importance of reliable recruiting
market information. Simply put, the more reliable and
accurate the market data, the easier it becomes to have a
successful recruiting environment; this improves the
retention environment. The implications of these second and
third order relationships for the quota system make it even
more imperative to adopt GAO ' s recommendations quickly. The
longer the Navy employs a sub-optimal system, the greater
the negative ramifications in the near and long-term.
F. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL STUDIES
Masters students at NPS have been the only source of
research into the PRIME system. In addition to PRIME, they
have studied the effects of existing quota systems and
incentive mechanisms, with particular emphasis on the
USAREC
.
Barfield (1993) studied Navy recruiter productivity and
incentive programs, including the Freeman Plan, The
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Recruiter Advancement Through Excellence (RATE) program, and
the Recruiter Excellence Incentive Program (REIP) . She
concluded that all three plans provide short-term
incentives, but are inadequate for the challenge of today's
recruiting environment. (Barfield, 1993, p. 20) In short,
the incentives offered to new Navy recruits are insufficient
to help recruiters reach their accession targets.
Therefore, systematic change is required.
Lyons and Riester (1993) studied the USAREC quota-based
recruiting process. Under a quota-based system, the
recruiters have little incentive to exceed their quota.
Lyons and Riester found that recruiters exhibit risk-averse
behavior in performing their duty. They concluded that a
quota system produces resource allocation inefficiencies.
They suggested that the PRIME system could help solve the
inefficiencies in USAREC s system. They recommended
developing analytical procedures to test the model in a
USAREC recruiting region.
O'Donnell (1996) built upon the work of Lyons and
Riester. He, too, studied the way the PRIME model could
improve the efficiency of the USAREC recruiting process. He
offered a methodology for implementing PRIME into USAREC at
the battalion level. Furthermore, he proposed a method to
integrate PRIME incentive points with the recruit categories
established in USAREC 's "Success 2000" plan.
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Pry (1996) analyzed the Navy's quota based system. He
examined historical data and Navy recruiting trends from FY
1990 to FY 1995. He also compared human behavior patterns
in the Navy against current organizational management
theory. He concluded that successful private sector
business management philosophy does not subscribe to quota-
based production concepts. Furthermore, he concluded that
the PRIME system embraces a management style helps maintain
a competitive advantage; therefore, it is a more viable
human resource strategy. Such a strategy would lead to
greater successes across the entire recruiting spectrum.
(Pry, 1996, p. 19)
Anderson and Whitaker (1994) addressed the feasibility
of monetary incentives within the USAREC. They conducted
field surveys of the USAREC recruiter force . The surveys
concluded that recruiters would be more responsive to a
PRIME system than the current quota system.
G. DONOMIT ISSUES
The Department of the Navy has been very proactive in
improving the recruiting process. In April of 1997, DONOMIT
published a comprehensive list of specific areas in which
the Navy could improve their business practices. Analysis
plans were formulated around each of the improvement areas.
One such plan was to address recruiting issues.
14
One particular issue was the contention that recruiter
incentives are not performance based. Using a long-term
timeline, they hope to analyze whether performance based
incentives will improve results; eventually, they plan to
implement a pilot program to evaluate performance based
incentives. (DONOMIT, 1997, p. 39)
This thesis applauds DONOMIT 's effort to follow up on
conclusions from previous studies and GAO ' s report. The
analytical concerns addressed by this group underscore the
immediacy and urgency for exploring innovative approaches,
like PRIME.
H . SUMMARY
Many past studies, from a variety of research bodies,
point to the need for more effective ways to recruit new
enlistees into both the military in general, and the Navy in
particular. Together with the austere, post-Cold War fiscal
environment, these research projects have emphasized re-
examining the quota-based recruiting system and the
processes by which this system impedes recruiter
productivity. Research performed by NPS students and
faculty in this area justifies the Navy's interest in
pursuing PRIME as an alternative to the quota system.
15
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This chapter discusses the Navy's current recruiting
process and quota system. It describes today's recruiting
environment, and discusses the Naval Recruiting Command's
organizational structure. After explaining how the current
quota system works, it concludes by examining the quota
system's advantages and disadvantages.
B . GENERAL
Since the end of the Cold War, the size of the active
duty Navy has decreased from almost 600,000 personnel in
1990 to just over 400,000 in 1997. The forecast is for
reductions continuing over the next few years and then
leveling off at the start of the next century. (DON Biennial
Budget, 1997, p. 2-12)
Figure 3-1 graphically displays active duty Navy end-
strength through fiscal year 2003.
Although the total force is shrinking, the demands on
the recruiting system are not. The total requirements for
Navy accessions remains almost 50,000 per year.
Figure 3-2 compares the total enlisted end strength to
the total accession requirement for FY 1996 through FY 1999.
(DON Biennial Budget p. 2-13)
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Source: DON Biennial Budget, FY97-98, p. 2-12)
FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Enlisted
End- Strength
355,048 341,748 331,107 325,880
Total
Accessions
40,840 48,189 47,666 47,630
Figure 3-2
Comparison of Enlisted End-Strength
to Total Accessions
Source: DON Biennial Budget, FY97-98, p2-13)
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The admiral in charge of the Navy's recruiting system
is the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) . CNRC
s
headquarters is situated in Arlington, Virginia; it is
scheduled to move to Memphis, Tennessee in fiscal year 1999.
CNRC divides the country into four Recruiting Areas
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(scheduled for disestablishment) . The Recruiting Areas are
further divided into 31 Recruiting Districts, almost 200
Recruiting Zones and approximately 1400 Recruiting Stations.
Additionally, there are Recruiting Districts operating
outside the contiguous 48 states in Great Britain, Germany,
Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.
There are three types of recruiters located at the
lowest levels of the organization. They are career
recruiters, enlisted production recruiters, and specialized
program recruiters
.
Career recruiters are men and women who have spent most
of their careers in the recruiting field. As full-time
recruiters assigned to leadership positions throughout the
organization, these senior enlisted personnel fulfill two
functions: (1) train and assist the production recruiters;
(2) bring cohesion and stability to the organization. There
are approximately 550 career recruiters throughout CNRC.
Enlisted production recruiters are the primary source
for enlisting new recruits into the Navy. They are men and
women who do most of the grunt work that goes into accessing
prospective recruits. There are approximately 3500 enlisted
production recruiters in the organization.
Specialized program recruiters are personnel who are
only temporarily assigned to recruiting duties. After
completing their duty, they return to the normal career
19
tracks of their communities or ratings. The number of
specialized program recruiters is constantly changing. Many
recruiting commands feel that these people are an essential
element of a successful recruiting campaign. They bring
fresh "operational perspectives" to the organization and
prospective recruits.
D. CURRENT RECRUITING PROCESS
The Navy's recruiting process starts when the Bureau of
Personnel, Accession Policy Division, establishes a total
number of accessions for the next fiscal year. This target
is sent to CNRC, who derives the new contract objective for
each of the Areas and Districts . The Area commands may use
CNRC's recommended District quotas, or modify them to
reflect the number of recruiters in the District, their
assessment of the District's markets, and the District's
past performance
.
The Districts, in turn, disseminate their quotas to the
Zones, using a computer application called Standardized
Territory Evaluation Analysis Management (STEAM) . The Zones
use STEAM to set quotas for the Stations.
On the lowest levels, the accession process begins with
the recruiter "prospecting" the market through various means
to contact potential recruits. Prospecting is very resource
intensive, usually requiring substantial time and money.
20
Once an applicant is found, the recruiter determines if
the potential recruit can meet the Basic Enlistment
Eligibility Requirements (also known as BEERS) . If the
BEERS are met, the applicant is sent to a Military Entrance
Processing Station (MEPS) to undergo physical, mental, and
oral testing. Once these tests are satisfied, the applicant
enters into the Personalized Recruiting for Immediate and
Delayed Enlistment (PRIDE) system. A very small percentage
of recruits immediately fill a school opening, the vast
majority enter into the Delayed Entry Program (DEP)
.
The Delayed Entry Program coordinates the recruit
accession process with the recruit training process. An
applicant enlists in the DEP while waiting for a seat in the
Navy's basic training school: The Recruit Training Command
(RTC) in Great Lakes, Illinois. This wait can sometimes
take the better part of a year. In the meantime, the
recruits are monitored by the recruiting office that signed
them. If recruits fail to enter RTC, they are counted as
"DEP losses". Since DEP losses waste recruiting resources,
recruiting commands spend considerable time and effort
ensuing the recruits ship out to RTC. Once the new
enlistees arrive in RTC, the recruiter's obligation is over.
21
E. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A QUOTA SYSTEM
1 . Advantages
There are not many advantages to quota systems in
today's recruiting environment. A quota system often seems
to be an effective way of scheduling and measuring
production, especially when there is no other way of doing
so. This was the was the case in the early 1970' s. When
the Navy started using the quota system, there was an
immediate and urgent need to access many recruits. The
quota system seemed to fit that need. There wasn't any
reason to believe the system would be inefficient.
As the years went on, the Navy became more familiar
with the quota system and, consequently, more comfortable
also. Today these advantages remain:
a. Performance can be easily measured on an
organizational and individual level.
b. It is easy to tie incentives to the quota
system. It is also easy to plan on the amounts and types of
incentives that will be administered.
c. It is easy to hold people accountable for
their action or inaction. Either recruiters make their
quotas or they don't. A command that doesn't make its
mission can clearly identify the culprits. The "non-




d. Goal-setting is a comfortable "fit" with a
directive, machine -like management style that most Navy-
policymakers embrace. Upper management directs the system
from above, rather than relying on the expertise of people
several layers below them.
e. Quota systems allow upper management to be
very specific in their requirements, yet permit middle
management the flexibility to tailor the system to their
unique management styles. Many different management plans
can achieve the same objectives. For instance, the
incentive plan for one Recruiting Station with historically
high production levels, could be quite different from a
Station that has historically low production levels.
2 . Disadvantages
In contrast to the few advantages, a quota system has
many disadvantages:
a. Quotas are set using historical data that, at
best, approximate market conditions.
b. Assigning quotas equitably among commands and
recruiters is very difficult. Regional markets and manpower
resources can change quite rapidly. An initially fair quota
allocation could quickly become unobtainable.
c. To ensure that they will be able to satisfy
the quota imposed on them, each layer in the recruiting
command hierarchy tends to over- inflate the requirements on
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their subordinates. As a result, the Recruiting Stations'
aggregate accession target can be significantly higher than
the aggregate total set by CNRC.
d. The people who best know the market, namely
the recruiters, play a limited and indirect role in
establishing the quotas.
There are further disadvantages to quota systems that
are a result of being tied to the Navy's reward structure:
a. The potential penalties for missing quotas
(i.e. a poor fitness report or evaluation, increased peer
pressure, increased demands in subsequent periods) are more
significant than the reward for exceeding quotas. This
creates a risk-averse working environment, and promotes
risk-averse behavior.
b. Since the penalty for missing the quota is so
great, there is strong pressure to lower quotas. As shown
later in the simulation, lowering a quota increases the
probability of success, but reduces total accessions.
c. Since historical performance is used to
determine future quotas, recruiters are encouraged to pace
their recruiting efforts. Recruiters who exceed their quota
in one or more periods, face a significant probability of
having their quota increased in subsequent periods. This
would require increased effort with the same resources, and
increase the probability of not achieving the mission. As a
24
result, after recruiters achieve quota in a period, they
tend to "hip-pocket" the excess potential recruits to shift
them to the next period.
d. Recruiters are not measured on how well they
maximize their market potential. Consequently, reliable
feedback on market potential never makes it back up the
chain of command. Lyons and Riester (1993) summarize the
negative effects of this situation:
In this risk-averse environment, there is no incentive to surpass
quotas from month to month regardless of a market's true potential.
Unfortunately, in the process, valuable field information that could reduce
aggregate recruiting costs is used only to help the recruiter in reducing his
own quota. As a result, the biased information in turn unnecessarily lowers
the perceived ability of recruiting and distorts management's view of actual
regional market potential. Therefore, if the national aggregate total is to be
met, it can only be accomplished through higher recruiting expenditures,
which might not actually be necessary if the original recruiting structure
were more efficient. (Lyons and Riester, 1993, p. 52)
e. There is no mechanism to ensure that
recruiters working different markets are rewarded equitably
for success or effort. In other words, recruiters
achieving a quota of three in one Recruiting Station can
reap the same reward as recruiters who match a quota of five
in another Station. Similarly, recruiters meeting their
quota can receive the same reward even if meeting the goals
require drastically different effort levels.
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F . SUMMARY
The Navy's quota-based recruiting system has been
around for a quarter century. Although it accomplished its
aim for the first fifteen years, austere budget conditions
in the last decade have accentuated the system's
inefficiencies. The quota system promotes risk-averse
behavior, and does not maximize the potential of either the
recruiter or the market. Furthermore, without reliable
market information travelling up the chain of command,
resources are allocated inefficiently throughout the system.
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IV. THE PRIME SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the Production Recruiting
Incentive Model (PRIME) system. It begins with a short
background discussion of PRIME. This is followed by a
presentation of the system's mechanics. The chapter




PRIME was developed in 1993 at the Naval Postgraduate
School by Professor Katsuaki Terasawa. Originally called
the Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM) , it was offered
as an alternative to the USAREC's inefficient quota system.
The basic idea underlying PRIME is as simple as it is
radical from current recruiting philosophy: local market
recruiters have the best understanding of how much
production they are able to achieve in any given period.
This level of production is a function of the local market
conditions as well as their personal capabilities (i.e.
knowledge, experience, ability to use available resources,
etc) . The local market conditions are not just the
historical perspective of industry trends and the cyclic
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nature of the market, but also encompass the socio-economic
factors on a small, local scale.
In PRIME, the recruiters set their own production
targets based on their knowledge of the market. The
recruiters' production levels will sum to become the
Recruiting Station's production which will sum to the Zone's
level and so on. While recruit production is being
achieved, PRIME will also afford exceptionally accurate
market data on which CNRC can allocate its resources. This
is achieved by statistically analyzing the recruiter's
ability to attain his forecast production levels.
C. MECHANICS OF PRIME
At the core of PRIME is an efficiency-enhancing, truth-
telling mechanism that also functions as a incentive point
allocation system. This mechanism is considered efficiency-
enhancing because it forces a recruiter to predict how many
new recruits he can access in a period. If the recruiter
actually achieves his forecasted total, he receives the
maximum number of incentive points available. Therefore, it
is in the recruiter's best interest to accurately forecast
and produce the maximum number of recruits that the market
can bear
.
Figure 4-1 is an example of a PRIME efficiency-
enhancing, truth-telling mechanism. It is also the
28




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
p 1 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
R 2 12 20 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4
3 15 24 35 24 15 14 13 12 11 10 9
D 4 19 29 41 55 41 29 19 18 17 16 15
U 5 24 35 48 63 80 63 48 35 24 23 22
C 6 30 42 56 72 90 110 90 72 56 42 30
T 7 37 50 65 82 101 122 145 122 101 82 65
1 8 45 59 75 93 113 135 159 185 159 135 113
9 54 69 86 105 126 149 174 201 230 201 174
N 10 64 80 98 118 140 164 190 218 248 280 248
11 75 92 111 132 155 180 207 236 267 300 335
Figure 4-1
PRIME Incentive Point Matrix
The two variables in this grid are Production and
Forecast totals. The production total is the amount of new
recruits that are produced in a particular period (i.e.
signed to a contract) . The range of possible production
values is from 1 to 11, as shown in the first column of
boldface numbers on the left side of the matrix.
The forecast total is the number of new recruits the
recruiter expects to produce in a given period. The range
of possible forecast values is also 1 to 11, as shown in the
first row of boldface numbers across the top of the matrix.
29
Reading down the columns and across the rows, one is
able to see the different point totals that can be earned
given the particular forecast and production totals. For
instance, a recruiter forecasting a production of six
recruits and producing seven will earn 122 points.
Similarly, a recruiter who forecasts eight recruits, but
only produces five, would earn 3 5 points.
There are two reasons why this device is considered
"truth- telling" . First, given a particular forecast, a
recruiter will always earn the most points by recruiting as
many people in a period as possible. Therefore, there is no
reason to hold back from maximum production. For example, a
recruiter forecasting a production of four and producing
four, earns 55 points. However, he picks up an extra 8
points by producing five recruits, for a total of 63.
Conversely, if he only produces three, he "loses" 29 points,
for a total of only 24
.
Second, a recruiter will also gain more points by
forecasting as closely as possible the maximum amount of
recruits he and the market can produce. For example,
suppose the market can provide five recruits, but the
recruiter believes it will only have four. By forecasting
and producing four, the recruiter earns 55 points. By
forecasting four and producing five the recruiter earns 63
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points. However, by forecasting five and producing five,
the recruiter earns the maximum 80 points.
Whenever there is a disparity between forecast and
production totals, the recruiter can determine the
opportunity loss of that disparity. In the above scenario,
where the recruiter forecasts four yet produces only three,
the recruiter is rewarded for actual production, but also
incurs an "opportunity loss" for being off the forecast. If
the forecast was in error (which implies the recruiter
produced everything possible given both market and personal
constraints), the opportunity loss is 11 points. The
recruiter would have earned 35 points by correctly
forecasting three. If the forecast was accurate (which
implies the recruiter could have made the target) , but
production suffered inexplicably, the opportunity loss is
29.
Truth-telling forces are also at work when production
exceeds the forecast. If the recruiter forecasts four and
produces five, there is also an opportunity cost. In this
scenario, because the forecast was in error the recruiter
earns a total of 63 points, in instead of the 80 potentially
earned with a more accurate prediction. This results in an
opportunity loss of 17 points.
Assuming that a recruiter will try to maximize total
expected incentive points (or minimize the opportunity
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loss) , this mechanism will encourage the recruiter to do his
best in both forecasting and production. The farther he can
move towards the lower right-hand corner of the matrix, the
better off he will be. For this reason, the mechanism is
considered to be "efficiency-enhancing" as well
.
D. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PRIME
1 . Advantages
There are many advantages to the PRIME system. Some of
these are the same as the advantages of a quota system:
a. Performance can be easily measured on an
organizational and individual level.
b. PRIME marries well with any incentive system,
is very flexible, and can be modified as the need arises.
When there is a fixed reward to allocate among all members
of a command (for example, a specific number of liberty
days) , it is easy to convert incentive points to percentages
of the reward.
c. PRIME permits CNRC to be very specific in
setting and modifying overall accession requirements. It is
very capable of maintaining quality marks (Anderson and
Whitaker, 1994, pp. 28-30) .
There are other advantages that are not found in quota
systems. Some of those address deficiencies of the quota
system.
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a. There are no disincentives to production.
Excess production is rewarded. Producing at low levels is
also rewarded because low production is usually due to
market conditions or factors outside the recruiter's
control
.
b. PRIME rewards good production and good
forecasting. By doing so, it places value on correctly
determining market conditions. It does not rely on
inaccurate historical algorithms or census data to measure
market potential. Data and economic decision-making are
more up-to-date and useful.
c. Good forecasting permits a more efficient
allocation of resources. The senior leaders can use the
better information to improve how they distribute money,
people, and support services.
d. It is very easy to identify people who might
be in need of further training or additional resources.
Disparities among recruiters working the same local market
would stand out
.
e. PRIME reduces, if not eliminates, the tendency
to "hip-pocket" recruits from period to period. There is no
pressure from above to produce as much in one period as was




The only disadvantage to PRIME is that it must replace
an archaic system that has a long tradition. Replacing the
current system requires an implementation strategy which
makes the transition painless. There cannot be any drop-off
in current productivity during this change. This is an
issue that must be researched and developed.
E . SUMMARY
The PRIME system maximizes a recruiters ability to
forecast and produce in a given market condition. By
combining forecasting with production, it proves to be both
truth- telling and efficiency enhancing. These two qualities
not only ensure that a high level of recruit accession is
achieved, but also that superior market information is
delivered up the chain of command. This information can
assist in resource allocation decision-making.
The advantages of a PRIME system are numerous . They
encompass most of the advantages of a quota system and
address its disadvantages. As a result, PRIME is a more





This chapter evaluates the PRIME system against the
quota system using two simulation models. After a general
overview, the first model is presented and its parameters
and assumptions discussed. Then, the three scenarios the
model compares are explained.
Next, the second model is presented and its parameters
and assumptions discussed. Finally, the model's two runs
are explained.
B. GENERAL OVERVIEW
Both computer simulation models use Monte Carlo random
number generation around normal distributions to represent a
hypothetical recruiting market. All simulation results
include 5000 trials using Microsoft Excel ' s Crystal Ball
program.
The first model was constructed to evaluate recruiter
performance and incentive awards in both the PRIME and the
quota systems, using identical market conditions. Three
quota scenarios were developed to approximate three general
recruiting environments. The recruiting environment affects
the way a command performs under alternative incentive
schemes. All three quota scenarios were evaluated against
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PRIME on three separate runs. Using three runs helps
eliminate the possibility that the overall results were
unique to a particular market condition.
The second model evaluated the quota system against
PRIME as the market variance increases. Whereas the first
model analyzed market conditions that could affect a
Recruiting Station, the second model looked at market
conditions that a Recruiting Zone might face. Two distinct
runs were conducted to evaluate different managerial
approaches to establishing the target quota. The first run
set the quota close to the market average; the second run
established the quota at a value covered by the market 90%
of the time.
C. FIRST MODEL SIMULATION
The first model compared three permutations of a quota
system against a PRIME system under three separate market
conditions. Specifically, it studied production and
incentive points in each of the three quota system scenarios
against PRIME production and incentive points, given the
identical market conditions.
Appendix A shows a detailed spreadsheet representation
of this model.
1. Parameters and Assumptions
The quota scenarios and the PRIME system were evaluated
under the following parameters and assumptions:
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a. A time interval including 36 periods. This is
comparable to monthly reporting periods over a three year
horizon
.
b. No seasonality or cyclical trends in market
conditions. Although these trends are present in real -world
market conditions, they were assumed to be non-existent in
the model ' s market
.
c. Market conditions were constructed using Monte
Carlo random number generation from a normal distribution.
The first run used a normal distribution with a mean of six
recruit accessions per period and a standard deviation of
one. The second and third runs used a mean of seven recruit
accessions per period and a standard deviation of two.
d. The normal quota for all three scenarios on
the first two runs was five. This value was derived using
the inverse of the normal cumulative distribution for both
sets of market conditions. In each case, a value of five
equates to an 85 percent confidence level. In other words,
85 percent of the time the market will yield more than five
recruit accessions per period.
e. On the third run, the normal quota was set at
six. This meant that there was only a 70 percent
probability that the unadjusted market conditions would
cover the quota. Therefore, it accentuates the behavioral
patterns of the recruiters in the three scenarios
.
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f. Each period the market potential was adjusted
to reflect a "carry-over" of unsigned recruits from the
previous period. In this model, the number of recruits
carried over assumed a 50 percent loss rate. For example,
if four potential recruits were not signed from the previous
period's market, two of these would "carry-over" and be
added to the next period's unadjusted market conditions.
g. The penalty for "hip-pocketing" recruits
(intentionally not signing a recruit in one period to use
that recruit against the next period's quota) was the same
as the carry-over loss rate. There was a 50-50 chance that
delayed accession recruits would change their minds and not
enlist in the Navy.
h. PRIME points were awarded using the same
truth-telling incentive point matrix explained in the last
chapter. Figure 4-1 illustrates this mechanism.
i. Quota incentive points were established to
reflect the point values given in PRIME. The baseline used
to equate the two systems was the average market condition
established in each run. For example, meeting quota earned
110 points in the first run. This was the identical value
one would receive under PRIME when forecasting and producing
the market average of six recruits. In the second and third
runs, the market average was seven. This corresponded to
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145 incentive points on the PRIME matrix. Therefore,
meeting quota also earned the recruiter 145 points.
j . Point values for exceeding quota were derived
using the same matrix. In both cases, exceeding quota
earned a point total that reflected moving up one level in
PRIME. In the first run, exceeding quota earned 35
additional points. This equaled the increase the recruiter
would earn in PRIME forecasting and producing seven recruits
vice six. In the second and third runs, moving from a
forecast and production level of seven to eight would
increase points by 40 on the PRIME matrix (145 to 185) .
Therefore, exceeding quota on these runs also earned an
additional 40 points for the recruiter. In the quota
system, it did not matter how much the recruiter exceeded
quota, the maximum additional point values were 3 5 or 40,
depending on the run.
k. Not meeting quota earned zero points in all
three runs. It did not matter how close the recruiter got to
the target, missing by one was equivalent to falling short
by several
.
1. The recruiter, in all three quota scenarios,
does not know the market variance. Normally, if a rational
recruiter knew the variance of his market, it would be
reasonable to expect him to behave accordingly. For
example, if the recruiter knew that the market variance was
39
small and his target quota was below the market mean, then
he would know there was a high probability that the market
would deliver that specific value in the next period. This
high probability would factor greatly into the amount of
risk he would face in a given period, and consequently
influence his behavior.
2 . Scenario "A"
In scenario A, the command adjusted the recruiter's
quota up (or down) if they observed a two period trend where
accessions were above (or below) the recruiter's quota. For
example, if the recruiter produced six recruits during
periods one and two when its quota was five, his quota was
adjusted to six the following period. The goal then
remained at six until another trend was established.
Conversely, if the recruiter produced only four for two
periods given a quota of five, then the subsequent adjusted
quota would drop by one recruit from five to four.
The recruiter's response, in this scenario, was to
maximize points without increasing the next period's quota.
The recruiter's performance depended on the points earned
the previous period. For example, if bonus points were
awarded in the previous period for exceeding quota, he would
simply try to meet the adjusted quota in the current period.
However, if he met or fell short of his quota in the
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previous period, then it would be desirable to exceed the
quota by one in the current period.
This scenario illustrated a very proactive management
philosophy, where strong performance was amply rewarded but
also resulted in greater expectations. The recruiter's
response implied that the point system was an effective
means for influencing the recruiter's behavior.
3 . Scenario "&"
In scenario B, the command was even more proactive in
restructuring the recruiter's quota to match production than
it was in scenario A. Not only did it increase the normal
quota if the two previous periods production exceeded goals,
it also added any shortfalls in previous production to the
current adjusted quota level. Furthermore, there was no
downward adjustment for under-productive trends.
For example, if the recruiter produced only four
recruits in the first period given a quota of five, then his
quota was adjusted to six in the second period. If the
second period's production was five, then period three's
quota went up to seven. On the other hand, if period two's
production was six (or seven), then period three's adjusted
quota would revert to five again.
This scenario simulated a more aggressive management
philosophy than in scenario A. Here, failure was not
tolerated. Shortfalls in production today meant even more
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was expected tomorrow. The fact that shortfalls may have
been attributed to market conditions was irrelevant; all
shortfalls carried the same consequences, whether for market
conditions or having an inexperienced recruiter corps.
It is easy to imagine a risk-averse response to this
environment. A risk-averse recruiter would try to meet the
quota and "hip-pocket" all excess potential recruits. He
would sacrifice this period's performance to heighten the
probability of attaining the next period's quota. However,
behavior in this scenario was the same as in scenario A.
The recruiter tried to maximize points without increasing
next period's quota.
4 . Scenario "c"
In scenario C, the recruiting command was not proactive
in restructuring the recruiter's quota to match production.
Here, the recruiter's previous shortfalls were not added to
the current period. Furthermore, upper management had no
stated policy on overproduction or underproduction trends.
They were more concerned with quota production over the
long-term. For instance, if a recruiter produced four
recruits in the first period when the quota was five, the
next period's quota stayed at five. If period two's




This managerial approach implied a confidence in the
historical quota setting process. The heads of the
recruiting organization were confident that the system would
operate effectively over the long-term.
Nonetheless, the recruiter still had a sense that the
quota could increase if they overproduced; this belief
helped guide recruiter behavior. In this scenario, the
recruiter's response maximized points provided that
production didn't exceed the cumulative quota totals. In
this regard, incentive points were used to bring the
recruiter back on track, and not to get ahead. For example,
if the recruiter produced two recruits in the first period
given a quota of five, then he would try to produce six
recruits in periods two through four.
This scenario illustrated behavior that was consistent
with a command that believed it was operating with limited
resources that would be over- taxed if higher quota goals
were assigned.
D. SECOND MODEL SIMULATION
The second model compared PRIME with a quota-based
system as the variance of the market conditions changed.
This model focused only on production, and not on incentive
points. It included two runs using separate methods for
establishing quotas.
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1 . Parameters and Assumptions
Both runs had the following parameters and assumptions:
a. A time span covering 3 6 periods to simulate
monthly reporting periods over a three year horizon.
b. No seasonality or cyclical trends built into
the market conditions.
c. Market conditions were constructed using Monte
Carlo random number generation from a normal distribution
around a mean of 100. The standard deviation was increased
in each scenario by increments of five, starting at five and
ending at 30.
d. In each scenario, the market potential was
adjusted to reflect a carryover of unsigned potential
recruits from the previous period. Like the first model,
the adjustment assumed a 50 percent loss rate to encompass
attrition, including the practice of "hip-pocketing".
e. With no incentives to complicate the process,
the Zone commands tried to meet production and not exceed
it. If the adjusted market potential was at or above the
target quota, then production equaled the quota. If the
adjusted market potential was below the target quota, then
production equaled the adjusted market potential.
f. The main metric under evaluation was the loss
in production. Loss was measured as the difference between
production and the actual (unadjusted) market potential.
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Because this unadjusted market potential was where PRIME
production would occur, this loss also measured PRIME
against the quota-system.
2. Run "A"
In run A, the assigned quota for all six scenarios was
kept near the market mean, using a target of 90 recruits.
Appendix B shows a detailed spreadsheet representation of
this run.
3. Run "B"
In run B, the quota was changed in each of the six
scenarios . The quota was set to a value that would be met
under unadjusted market conditions at least 90% of the time.
As the market variance increased, the target quota decreased
to ensure a 90% success rate for the command. The target
quota was derived using the inverse of the normal cumulative
distribution for each of the six market conditions. Figure
5-1 shows the relationship of the quota to market
conditions. Appendix C shows a spreadsheet representation of
this run.
Standard Deviation










Determination of Market Quota
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VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents and analyzes the computer
simulation results. It begins by looking at the first
model ' s production results and incentive points for each of
the three runs. Next, it analyzes PRIME'S performance in
each scenario. This is followed by an overall production
and incentive analysis. The last segment of this chapter
presents and analyzes the second model's results.
B. FIRST MODEL RESULTS
1. Production
Figure 6-1 shows the production results of the three
runs
.
On the first run, PRIME produced an average of 216.08
recruits over the 3 6 month span. The range of production
went from a low of 192 to a high of 235. These values were
all greater than any of the three quota system scenarios.
Scenario A returned an average of 194.97 recruits with a low
of 161 and a high of 198. Scenario B returned the highest
mean of the three quota scenarios at 196.75 recruits, with a
low of 188 and a high of 198. Scenario C had a mean of
179.98 recruits, and a range of just 178 to 180.
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On the second run, PRIME'S production increased to an
average of 247.01 recruits, with a range of 207 to 287. The
other three scenarios change relatively little. Scenario A
actually decreased to a mean of 187.38 recruits, with a low
of 123 and a high of 197. Scenario B returned a mean of
196.12 recruits, with a low of 188 and a high of 198.
Scenario C returned an average of 179.9 recruits, and a
range from 175 to 180.
First Run: N(6,1) and Quota = 5
Low Mean High Range Std Dev
PRIME 192 216.08 235 43 6.27
Scenario A 161 194.97 198 37 5.55
Scenario B 188 196.75 198 10 1.29
Scenario C 178 179.98 180 2 0.14
First Run: N(7,2) and Quota = 5
Low Mean High Range Std Dev
PRIME 207 247.01 287 80 12.23
Scenario A 123 187.38 197 74 12.52
Scenario B 188 196.12 198 10 1.34
Scenario C 175 179.9 180 5 0.44
First Run: N(7,2) and Quota = 6
Low Mean High Range Std Dev
PRIME 211 246.52 283 72 12.17
Scenario A 131 203.83 230 99 17.79
Scenario B 207 226.71 233 26 3.85
Scenario C 198 214.19 216 18 2.91
Figure 6-1
PRIME vs Quota Production
On the third run, PRIME'S production stayed relatively
unchanged, with a mean of 246.52 recruits, a low of 211 and
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a high of 283. Performance in all three quota scenarios
increased, however. Scenario A returned the lowest mean in
this run at 203.83 recruits, with a low of 131 and a high of
230. Scenario B was still the highest of the three at
226.71 recruits, with a range of 207 to 233. Scenario C
still had the smallest range, from 198 to 216, around a mean
of 214.19 recruits.
2 . Incentive Points Earned
Figure 6-2 shows the incentive points earned in the
three runs
.
First Run: N(6,1) and Quota = 5
Low Mean High Range Std Dev
PRIME 3345 4062.9 4690 1345 205.6
Scenario A 3825 4444.2 4590 765 122.82
Scenario B 2700 4358.5 4590 1890 244.64
Scenario C 3545 3916.1 3960 415 61.97
First Run: N(7,2) and Quota = 5
Low Mean High Range Std Dev
PRIME 4035 5440.4 7020 2985 443.66
Scenario A 4990 5592.6 5795 805 167.37
Scenario B 2970 5331.4 5795 2825 367.74
Scenario C 4515 5100.1 5275 760 111.52
First Run: N(7,2) and Quota = 6
Low Mean High Range Std Dev
PRIME 4185 5423.7 6800 2615 442.8
Scenario A 4330 5249.5 5795 1465 246.48
Scenario B 3809.4 5610 5610 1001.5
Scenario C 3630 4782.3 5290 1660 291.12
Figure 6-2
PRIME vs Quota Incentive Points
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On the first run, PRIME earned an average of 4062.94
points, with a range of 3345 to 4690. This was similar to
the means in all three scenarios. However, two of the quota
scenarios earned greater totals. Scenario A averaged
4444.18 points, with a low of 3825 and a high of 4590.
Scenario B earned a mean of 4358.45 points, with a low of
2700 and a high of 4590. Scenario C earned 3916.14 points
on average, with a range of 3545 to 3960.
On the second run, with the market conditions a little
less stable, PRIME earned 5440.41 points, with a range of
4035 to 7020. Scenario A, the only scenario to out-earn
PRIME, averaged 5592.63 points, with a low of 4990 and a
high of 5795. Scenario B had a mean of 5331.39 points, and
a range of 2970 to 5795. Scenario C earned 5100.06 on
average, with a low of 4515 and a high of 5275.
On the third run, with the quota raised to six, average
PRIME results stayed relatively constant at 5423.73 points,
with a range from 4185 to 6800. All three quota scenarios
decreased in average points. Scenario A had a mean of
5249.45 points, and a range of 4330 to 5795. Scenario B had
the lowest average, 3809.44 points, with a low of zero and a
high of 5610. Scenario C earned an average of 4782.27
points, with a low of 3630 and a high of 5290.
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C. ANALYSIS OF FIRST MODEL
1. Prime vs. Scenario A
In all three runs, PRIME produced more recruits than
the quota-based system. The differences in production were
21.12, 59.63 and 42.69 recruits.
In incentive points, PRIME did not fair as well in two
of the three runs. Differences in point totals were
-381.24, -152.23, and 174.29 points. As one can see,
however, PRIME'S performance relative to the quota scenarios
improves as the recruiting environment becomes more
unpredictable
.

















N(6,1) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=6
Figure 6-3
PRIME'S Advantage Over Scenario A
2. Prime vs. Scenario B
In all three runs, PRIME produced more recruits than
the quota scenario. However, the differences in production
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were narrower than scenario A. Here the differences were
19.33, 50.9, and 19.81 recruits.
Regarding incentive points, PRIME earned more points on
two of the three runs. Differences in point totals were
-295.51, 109.02, and 1614.29 points. The last average
underscores the quota scenario's volatility in an
unpredictable environment
.


















N(6,1) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=6
Figure 6-4
PRIME ' s Advantage Over Scenario B
3 . PRIME vs . Scenario C
Once again, PRIME out -produced its quota rival in
scenario C. The production difference here is 36.1, 67.11
and 32.34 recruits.
With incentive points, PRIME earned more on all three


















N(6.1) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=6
Figure 6-5
PRIME ' s Advantage Over Scenario C
4. Production Analysis
PRIME has shown that it will generate more recruits
than its quota-based rivals, regardless of the recruiting
environment . The closest any of the scenarios came to
matching PRIME was scenario B in the first run. The
increase in mean production in this run was still 19.33
recruits, which equates to almost four months of recruiting
work at the quota level . The biggest increase was in
scenario C during the second run. PRIME generated 67.11
more recruits, which equated to 9.5 months of recruiting
work in PRIME and 13.5 months in the quota system.
The model also illustrates that a quota-based system's
performance varies with the recruiting environment. In the
first run, the environment is relatively stable (i.e. a
53
small market variance and a quota set at a level to ensure a
high probability of success) . All three quota scenarios
were able to achieve their three-year cumulative quota of
180 recruits. In fact, scenarios A and B consistently
exceeded their quota by almost 15 and 17 recruits,
respectively.
In the second run, the environment became more unstable
(i.e. a higher market variance) . Only scenario C was able to
maintain the same level of production, barely meeting its
quota of 180 recruits. Scenarios A and B, while still
exceeding quota, saw their excess levels drop to 7 and 16
recruits, respectively.
In the third run, the environment was the most
unpredictable (i.e. the same market variance as the second
run, with a quota set at a 70% success level) . Here, only
scenario B produced excess recruits; yet the level of excess
dropped to 11. Scenarios A and C were not able to
consistently make their quota, averaging respective
shortfalls of approximately 12 and 2 recruits.
Figure 6-6 compares the production results of the
first run.
5. Incentive Points Analysis
Comparing incentive point performance, PRIME showed
varying degrees of success against the quota systems. PRIME
outperformed scenario A only once, scenario B twice, and
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scenario C all three times. From an individual recruiter
perspective, this relative "lack of success" might seem to
support the viability of the quota system. However, from a
management point of view, it underscores the quota system's
weakness. In all three cases, management was paying out
extra incentives for significantly less production. This
fact supports contentions that quota systems reward sub-
optimum performance.







N(6,1) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=6
Figure 6-6
First Run Production
Similar to the production results, the quota system is
affected by the recruiting environment. As the recruiting
environment became more unstable or unpredictable, the quota
system fared worse relative to PRIME. On the first run,
both scenarios A and B earned more points than PRIME. On
the second run, only scenario A earned more points. On the
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third run, PRIME earned more points than any of the
scenarios. Ironically, scenario B was the only scenario to
average more than its three-year quota of 216 recruits
during the last run, yet earned the fewest points.





N(6,1) Q=5 N(7,2) Q=5 N(7.2) Q=6
Figure 6-7
First Run Incentive Points
D. SECOND MODEL RESULTS
1. First Run Results
In the first run, when the target quota was kept at 90
recruits, production decreased as the variance of the market
increased. Production went from a high of 3240 recruits,
when the market's standard deviation was five, to a low of
3081 recruits, when the market's standard deviation was 30.







Std Dev Low High Range
5 3239.93 0.49 3230 3240 10
10 3232.83 8.39 3178 3240 62
15 3206.66 23.89 3090 3240 150
20 3170.01 40.78 2940 3240 300
25 3127.96 57.34 2866 3240 374
30 3078.68 77.34 2707 3240 533
Figure 6-8
First Run Quota Production
Additionally, increasing market variance increased the
Quota Loss total. When the market's standard deviation was
five, quota loss averaged 3 62.03 recruits, with a range from
251 to 475. When the standard deviation was 30, the quota
loss mean increased to 633.91 recruits with a corresponding
increase in range from 215 to 1108.








Std Dev Low High Range
5 362.03 29.67 251 475 224
10 390.88 51.11 219 588 369
15 441.90 71.05 223 753 530
20 502.10 89.07 207 810 603
25 566.29 107.60 209 964 755
30 633 .91 124.75 215 1108 893
Figure 6-9
First Run Quota Loss Results
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The cumulative frequency counts indicate how many times
the Zone achieved their three-year target. When the
market's standard deviation was five, the Zone achieved its
mission 97 percent of the time. When the standard deviation
was 30, this success rate fell to one-tenth of one percent.
















Three Year Quota Success Rate
2. Second Run Results
In the second run, the target quota was set at a value
corresponding to a 90 percent probability of achieving the
period's goal. The overall results were similar to the
first run. Production again decreased as the variance of
the market increased. However, the decline was more
dramatic, from a high of 3347.29 recruits, when the standard
deviation was five, to a low of 2189.16, when the standard
deviation was 30.
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Std Dev Low High Range
5 93 3347.29 1.64 3332 3348 16
10 87 3129.75 4.37 3084 3132 48
15 80 2877.03 6.14 2825 2880 55
20 74 2659.42 8.81 2581 2664 83
25 68 2442 .17 11.08 2355 2448 93
30 61 2189.16 13 .04 2076 2196 120
Figure 6-11
Second Run Production
Additionally, there was a significant increase in Quota
Loss. When the market's standard deviation was five, Quota
Loss averaged 258.10 recruits, with a low of 156 and a high
of 3 63. When the standard deviation was 30, the Quota Loss
mean was 1455.19 recruits, with a range of 796 to 2090.







Std Dev Low High Range
5 93 258.10 28.16 156 363 207
10 87 484.67 55.19 295 719 424
15 80 741.37 82.91 487 1061 574
20 74 966.44 109.63 545 1404 859
25 68 1194.33 137.21 676 1706 1030
30 61 1455.19 167.71 796 2090 1294
Figure 6-12
Second Run Quota Loss Results
59
The cumulative frequency counts show that success
(measured by the frequency with which the Zone met its
cumulative three-year goal) was fairly constant at 60 to 75
percent
.








5 93 3771 .7542
10 87 3218 .6436
15 80 3313 .6626
20 74 3123 .6246
25 68 3007 .6014
30 61 3056 .6112
Figure 6-13
Three Year Quota Success Rate
E. SECOND MODEL ANALYSIS
The first run shows that increases in market variance
negatively impact recruit production under the quota system.
As the market variance increases, recruit production
decreases. Additionally, there is a larger differential
between the market's potential and quota production. This
difference equals the benefit the PRIME system has over the
quota system.
The second run shows that lowering quotas to achieve
desirable success rates further decreases production. It
also increases the opportunity loss of using a quota system
instead of a more efficient system like PRIME.
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F . SUMMARY
There is great significance to the results presented by
both simulation models. They illustrate the relative
inefficiency of the quota system compared to PRIME. They
also highlight a never-ending problem faced by upper echelon
recruiting command management: What is the correct action to
take in a quota system when the quota is not being achieved?
For example, in the second model's first run, the
market's standard deviation was 15. The Recruiting Zone
only achieved its three-year goal of 3240 recruits 3.6
percent of the time. To make matters more complicated, it
missed its target by an average of only 32 recruits (3240 -
3207.92) . How should the Recruiting District respond?
Increasing the Zone's quota could very well increase
production, depending upon the relationship of the two
levels and the Zone's behavior (as shown by the first
model) . However, the cost of this action is the increased
probability that the Zone will not achieve its quota. If
the District lowers the quota to increase the Zone's success
rate, then the cost is substantially lower levels of
production and higher levels of unsigned potential recruits.
In a nutshell, this is the District's dilemma.
In any quota system operating in a relatively unstable
market (i.e. a wide market variance), it does not matter if
the commands are optimizing their recruiting environment or
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enjoying the benefits of a generous carry-over rate (as was
the case in both models) . The quota system demands a trade-
off between production and success in achieving the quota.
These two desirable objectives are inversely related.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter concludes this thesis. It presents the
study's overall findings and makes recommendations for
follow-on action or future areas of research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Previous research by NPS masters students has found
PRIME to be a vastly superior recruiting system to the
quota-based systems found in other services. The same holds
true for the CNRC quota system, as demonstrated by the
computer simulation. Specifically, the following
conclusions apply:
1. Given identical market conditions, PRIME will
always out-perform a quota-based recruiting system. This is
due to the inherent deficiencies found in a quota system, as
well as to the efficiency-enhancing truth-telling mechanics
of PRIME.
2. As the variance of the market increases, the
superiority of PRIME over a quota system increases in terms
of production and recruiter reward.
Additionally, the computer simulation illustrated some
of the inherent problems in any quota system:
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1. Different managerial approaches to stimulating
production will often have the reverse effect: recruiters
adopt risk-averse behavior. Similarly, the extent of this
negative effect will vary as the standard deviation of the
market varies
.
2. Under different market conditions, and assuming
recruiters will respond rationally, there are quota control
mechanisms that will have a greater negative impact than
others
.
3. As the variance of the market increases, under a
ceteris parabis assumption, the probability of achieving
quota decreases.
3. Reducing quotas to increase the probability of
success in a given market, will lower production levels.
Furthermore, it will increase the market opportunity loss
that could have been eliminated using PRIME.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
The author recommends the following:
1. Abandon CNRC ' s current quota-based recruiting
system.
2. Implement the PRIME system into CNRC.
3 . Study further how different managerial styles and
attitudes can adversely affect production in a quota system.
4. Develop alternative reward plans that can be
married to PRIME'S incentive points matrix.
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5. Develop methods for assessing the socio-economic
conditions on a local market scale. Current algorithms use
risky historical data on a scale that is too large to
reflect the substantial local market variances.
6. Study cost-effective methods for implementing
PRIME. Although long-run benefits outweigh the long-run
costs, making PRIME a long-term asset, short-term transition
costs could impede implementation.
65
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APPENDIX A. FIRST MODEL
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
1 PRIME Incentive Table
2 FORECAST
3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
4 P 1 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 R 2 12 20 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4
6 O 3 15 24 35 24 15 14 13 12 11 10 9
7 D 4 19 29 41 55 41 29 19 18 17 16 15
8 U 5 24 35 48 63 80 63 48 35 24 23 22
9 C 6 30 42 56 72 90 110 90 72 56 42 30
10 T 7 37 50 65 82 101 122 145 122 101 82 65
11 I 8 45 59 75 93 113 135 159 185 159 135 113
12 O 9 54 69 86 105 126 149 174 201 230 201 174
13 N 10 64 80 98 118 140 164 190 218 248 280 248
14 11 75 92 111 132 155 180 207 236 267 300 335
15 Quota System Parameters
16 Quota incentive plan: Run#1 Run #2 & 3
17 Meet quota: 110 pts 145 pts
18 Exceed quota: 35 pts 40 pts
19 No quota: pts pts
20
21 Scenario "A": Quota is adjusted up/down if a two period trend (in which production is
22 above or below quota) is evidenced.
23 Production tries to maximize points earned. Exceeding quota is OK if
24 it does not result in an increase in the next period's quota.
25 Scenario "B": Quota is adjusted if mission is not achieved the period before. Two
26 period trends in production are of no consequence.
27 Production tries to maximize points earned. Exceeding quota is OK if
28 it does not result in an increase in the next period's quota.
29 Scenario "C": Quota stays the same from period to period with no adjustment.
30 Production tries to maximize points. Exceeding quota is OK as long as












APPENDIX A. FIRST MODEL
P Q R s T u V w X Y z AA AB AC
1 Rnd Market Quota Prod Norm Market Quota Prod
2 Market Mkt Norm Potent Adj Prod Pts Quota Potent Adj Prod Pts
3 N(6,1) Pot Quota Adj "A" "A" "A" "A" Adj Adj "B" "B" "B" "B"
4 5 0.5
5 8.8476 9 5 9 5 6 145 5 9 5 6 145
6 6.1954 6 5 7.5 5 5 110 5 7.5 5 5 110
7 5.8747 6 5 7.25 5 6 145 5 7.25 5 6 145
8 5.1858 5 5 5.625 5 5 110 5 5.625 5 5 110
9 6.2865 6 5 6.3125 5 6 145 5 6.3125 5 6 145
10 4.6768 5 5 5.15625 5 5 110 5 5.1563 5 5 110
11 5.9519 6 5 6.07813 5 6 145 5 6.0781 5 6 145
12 5.6249 6 5 6.03906 5 5 110 5 6.0391 5 5 110
13 6.5334 7 5 7.51953 5 6 145 5 7.5195 5 6 145
14 6.4011 6 5 6.75977 5 5 110 5 6.7598 5 5 110
15 4.6419 5 5 5.87988 5 6 145 5 5.8799 5 6 145
16 6.5772 7 5 7 5 5 110 5 7 5 5 110
17 6.0468 6 5 7 5 6 145 5 7 5 6 145
18 4.314 4 5 4.5 5 5 110 5 4.5 5 5 110
19 7.9039 8 5 8 5 6 145 5 8 5 6 145
20 6.5797 7 5 8 5 5 110 5 8 5 5 110
21 6.7774 7 5 8.5 5 6 145 5 8.5 5 6 145
22 6.3209 6 5 7.25 5 5 110 5 7.25 5 5 110
23 7.1328 7 5 8.125 5 6 145 5 8.125 5 6 145
24 6.5968 7 5 8.0625 5 5 110 5 8.0625 5 5 110
25 5.3035 5 5 6.53125 5 6 145 5 6.5313 5 6 145
26 4.9109 5 5 5.26563 5 5 110 5 5.2656 5 5 110
27 4.6032 5 5 5.13281 5 6 145 5 5.1328 5 6 145
28 3.8282 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
29 7.2512 7 5 7 5 6 145 5 7 6 7 145
30 6.5787 7 5 7.5 5 5 110 5 7 5 5 110
31 6.4767 6 5 7.25 5 6 145 5 7 5 6 145
32 5.1507 5 5 5.625 5 5 110 5 5.5 5 5 110
33 5.4208 5 5 5.3125 5 6 145 5 5.25 5 6 145
34 4.5275 5 5 5 5 5 110 5 5 5 5 110
35 4.389 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
36 6.1755 6 5 6 5 6 145 5 6 6 6 110
37 6.9527 7 5 7 5 5 110 5 7 5 6 145
38 4341 4 5 5 5 5 110 5 4.5 5 5 110
39 4.4682 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
40 6.7941 7 5 7 5 6 145 5 7 6 7 145
41 212 180 231.175 180 194 4225 180 229.74 183 197 4225
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APPENDIX A. FIRST MODEL
AD AE AF AG AH Al AJ AK AL AM
1 Cum Market Quota Cum Prod I Market
2 Norm Potent Adj Prod Prod Points Max Prod PRIME
3 Quota Adj"C" "C" "C" "C" "C" (PRIME) Points
4
5 5 9 5 5 5 110 9 230
6 10 8 5 5 10 110 6 110
7 15 7.5 5 5 15 110 6 110
8 20 6.25 5 5 20 110 5 80
9 25 6.625 5 5 25 110 6 110
10 30 5.8125 5 5 30 110 5 80
11 35 6.4063 5 5 35 110 6 110
12 40 6.7031 5 5 40 110 6 110
13 45 7.8516 5 5 45 110 7 145
14 50 7.4258 5 5 50 110 6 110
15 55 6.2129 5 5 55 110 5 80
16 60 7.6064 5 5 60 110 7 145
17 65 7.3032 5 5 65 110 6 110
18 70 5.1516 5 5 70 110 4 55
19 75 8.0758 5 5 75 110 8 185
20 80 8.5379 5 5 80 110 7 145
21 85 8.769 5 5 85 110 7 145
22 90 7.8845 5 5 90 110 6 110
23 95 8.4422 5 5 95 110 7 145
24 100 8.721
1
5 5 100 110 7 145
25 105 6.8606 5 5 105 110 5 80
26 110 5.9303 5 5 110 110 5 80
27 115 5.4651 5 5 115 110 5 80
28 120 4.2326 5 4 119 4 55
29 125 7.1163 5 6 125 145 7 145
30 130 7.5581 5 5 130 110 7 145
31 135 7.2791 5 5 135 110 6 110
32 140 6.1395 5 5 140 110 5 80
33 145 5.5698 5 5 145 110 5 80
34 150 5.2849 5 5 150 110 5 80
35 155 4.1424 5 4 154 4 55
36 160 6.0712 5 6 160 145 6 110
37 165 7.0356 5 5 165 110 7 145
38 170 5.0178 5 5 170 110 4 55
39 175 4.0089 5 4 174 4 55
40 180 7.0045 5 6 180 145 7 145
41 243 180 180 3735 212 3960
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APPENDIX A. FIRST MODEL
AN AO AP AQ AR AS AT AU
1 PRIME vs PRIME vs. PRIME vs. PRIME vs PRIME vs PRIME vs.
2 Quota "A" Quota "B" Quota "C" Quota "A" Quota "B" Quota "C"
3 Prod Prod Prod Points Points Points
4 Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference
5 3 3 4 85 85 120
6 1 1 1
7 1 -35 -35
8 -30 -30 -30
9 1 -35 -35
10 -30 -30 -30
11 1 -35 -35
12 1 1 1
13 1 1 2 35
14 1 1 1
15 -1 -1 -65 -65 -30
16 2 2 2 35 35 35
17 1 -35 -35
18 -1 -1 -1 -55 -55 -55
19 2 2 3 40 40 75
20 2 2 2 35 35 35
21 1 1 2 35
22 1 1 1
23 1 1 2 35
24 2 2 2 35 35 35
25 -1 -1 -65 -65 -30
26 -30 -30 -30
27 -1 -1 -65 -65 -30
28 55 55 55
29 1 1
30 2 2 2 35 35 35
31 1 -35 -35
32 -30 -30 -30
33 -1 -1 -65 -65 -30
34 -30 -30 -30
35 55 55 55
36 -35 -35
37 2 1 2 35 35
38 -1 -1 -1 -55 -55 -55
39 55 55 55
40 1 1
41 18 15 32 -265 -265 225
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APPENDIX A. FIRST MODEL
AV AW AX AY AZ BA
1 Legend
2 (Same for all three runs)
3
4 Note: Formulas are the same for all scenarios unless noted below.
5 Col Q Actual Market Potential (based on normal distribution parameters in parentheses)
6 Col R Market Potential (Col Q in integer form)
7 Col S Normal Quota (with quota value shown underneath)
8 Col U Adjusted Market Potential for given scenario (with Loss Rate shown underneath)
9 Col V Adjusted Quota for given scenario
10 Col W Production for given scenario
11 Col X Production Points earned in given scenario
12 Col Z Normal Quota Adjusted
13 Col AG Cumulative Normal Quota
14 ColAK Cumulative Production for given scenario
15 Col AN Market Maximum Production (also called PRIME production)
16 ColAO PRIME Points earned
17 ColAQ PRIME vs given scenario Production Difference




























APPENDIX B. SECOND MODEL RUN A
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Actual Int Adj Loss P Actual Int Adj Loss P
2 Rec. Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT V Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT V
3 Per. N(100,5) Pot 90 Pot Quota Q N(100,10) Pot 90 Pot Quota Q
4
5 1 98.499 98 90 98.5 90 8 106.215 106 90 106.2 90 16
6 2 93.612 94 90 97.86 90 4 95.4545 95 90 103.6 90 5
7 3 101.22 101 90 105.2 90 11 115.284 115 90 122.1 90 25
8 4 106.38 106 90 114 90 16 108.935 109 90 125 90 19
9 5 105.99 106 90 118 90 16 113.527 114 90 131 90 24
10 6 108.67 109 90 122.7 90 19 95.2363 95 90 115.7 90 5
11 7 89.082 89 90 105.4 90 110.063 110 90 122.9 90 20
12 8 98.829 99 90 106.5 90 9 82.0065 82 90 98.47 90
13 9 105.48 105 90 113.7 90 15 104.202 104 90 108.4 90 14
14 10 94.566 95 90 106.4 90 5 87.5419 88 90 96.76 90
15 11 96.549 97 90 104.8 90 7 99.365 99 90 102.7 90 9
16 12 91.548 92 90 98.93 90 2 107.02 107 90 113.4 90 17
17 13 90.765 91 90 95.23 90 1 107.821 108 90 119.5 90 18
18 14 95.112 95 90 97.73 90 5 98.845 99 90 113.6 90 9
19 15 96.132 96 90 100 90 6 102.312 102 90 114.1 90 12
20 16 89.41 89 90 94.41 90 85.9609 86 90 98.02 90
21 17 97.16 97 90 99.36 90 7 96.1975 96 90 100.2 90 6
22 18 97.98 98 90 102.7 90 8 100.002 100 90 105.1 90 10
23 19 100.67 101 90 107 90 11 88.915 89 90 96.47 90
24 20 98.173 98 90 106.7 90 8 102.35 102 90 105.6 90 12
25 21 98.365 98 90 106.7 90 8 110.324 110 90 118.1 90 20
26 22 98.149 98 90 106.5 90 8 100.943 101 90 115 90 11
27 23 106.71 107 90 115 90 17 100.752 101 90 113.3 90 11
28 24 99.574 100 90 112.1 90 10 102.305 102 90 113.9 90 12
29 25 99.069 99 90 110.1 90 9 89.8646 90 90 101.8 90
30 26 97.434 97 90 107.5 90 7 88.784 89 90 94.7 90
31 27 109.86 110 90 118.6 90 20 117.99 118 90 120.3 90 28
32 28 104.33 104 90 118.6 90 14 97.2154 97 90 112.4 90 7
33 29 111.88 112 90 126.2 90 22 92.339 92 90 103.5 90 2
34 30 96.725 97 90 114.8 90 7 92.8394 93 90 99.61 90 3
35 31 108.31 108 90 120.7 90 18 103.551 104 90 108.4 90 14
36 32 91.938 92 90 107.3 90 2 104.219 104 90 113.4 90 14
37 33 102.69 103 90 111.3 90 13 104.796 105 90 116.5 90 15
38 34 104.51 105 90 115.2 90 15 99.5788 100 90 112.8 90 10
39 35 109.59 110 90 122.2 90 20 101.618 102 90 113 90 12
40 36 99.577 100 90 115.7 90 10 91.6291 92 90 103.1 90 2
41 3596 3240 3240 358 3606 3240 3240 382
42
43
44 IA = Recruiting Period ColH =Production vs Quota
45 IB = Actual Market Potential C5 =ROUND(B5,0)
46 IC = Integer of market Potential (Col B) D5 =Quota
47 ID = Quota (value below it) E5 =IF(F4=ROUND(E4,0),B5,B5+(0.5*(E4-F4)))
48 IE = Adjusted Market Potential F5 =IF(D5>E5,ROUND(E5,0),D5)
|
49 IF = Production G5 =IF(ROUND(B5,0)-F5<0,0,ROUND(B5,0)-F5)
50 IG = Loss Due To Quota H5 =IF(F5>=D5,0,1)
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APPENDIX B. SECOND MODEL RUN A
Q R S T U V W X Y z AA AB AC AD AE AF
1 Actual Int Adj Loss P Actual Int Adj Loss P
2 Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT V Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT V
3 N(100,15) Pot 90 Pot Quota Q N(100,20) Pot 90 Pot Quota Q
4
5 76.1774 76 90 76.18 76 1 125.854 126 90 125.9 90 36
6 97.1527 97 90 97.15 90 7 74.2373 74 90 92.16 90
7 90.0509 90 90 93.63 90 108.814 109 90 109.9 90 19
8 101.318 101 90 103.1 90 11 86.2793 86 90 96.23 90
9 85.7662 86 90 92.33 90 118.044 118 90 121.2 90 28
10 127.473 127 90 128.6 90 37 83.3448 83 90 98.92 90
11 101.153 101 90 120.5 90 11 88.3545 88 90 92.82 90
12 92.2796 92 90 107.5 90 2 87.4636 87 90 88.87 89 1
13 84.3014 84 90 93.06 90 93.8464 94 90 93.85 90 4
14 125.092 125 90 126.6 90 35 79.8845 80 90 81.81 82 1
15 101.744 102 90 120.1 90 12 141.813 142 90 141.8 90 52
16 85.7031 86 90 100.7 90 141.544 142 90 167.5 90 52
17 91.7694 92 90 97.13 90 2 84.4637 84 90 123.2 90
18 114.2 114 90 117.8 90 24 91.6076 92 90 108.2 90 2
19 95.2667 95 90 109.2 90 5 93.4295 93 90 102.5 90 3
20 86.4274 86 90 96 90 132.22 132 90 138.5 90 42
21 83.8006 84 90 86.8 87 1 79.2056 79 90 103.4 90
22 97.9946 98 90 97.99 90 8 93.9041 94 90 100.6 90 4
23 102.285 102 90 106.3 90 12 116.483 116 90 121.8 90 26
24 119.946 120 90 128.1 90 30 120.539 121 90 136.4 90 31
25 121.85 122 90 140.9 90 32 96.8002 97 90 120 90 7
26 112.527 113 90 138 90 23 56.8761 57 90 71.89 72 1
27 102.132 102 90 126.1 90 12 144.219 144 90 144.2 90 54
28 87.4842 87 90 105.5 90 84.4285 84 90 111.5 90
29 119.707 120 90 127.5 90 30 115.619 116 90 126.4 90 26
30 85.6433 86 90 104.4 90 112.399 112 90 130.6 90 22
31 117.045 117 90 124.2 90 27 82.4067 82 90 102.7 90
32 122.311 122 90 139.4 90 32 109.977 110 90 116.3 90 20
33 112.607 113 90 137.3 90 23 109.91 110 90 123.1 90 20
34 119.653 120 90 143.3 90 30 90.3953 90 90 106.9 90
35 96.6969 97 90 123.4 90 7 109.091 109 90 117.6 90 19
36 76.6898 77 90 93.37 90 71 .4762 71 90 85.25 85 1
37 86.2153 86 90 87.9 88 1 92.646 93 90 92.65 90 3
38 96.9281 97 90 96.93 90 7 115.592 116 90 116.9 90 26
39 78.1863 78 90 81.65 82 1 68.3548 68 90 81.81 82 1
40 149.2 149 90 149.2 90 59 65.6089 66 90 65.61 66 1











APPENDIX B. SECOND MODEL RUN A
AG AH Al AJ AK AL AM AN A AP AQ AR AS AT AU AV
1 Actual Int Adj Loss P Actual Int Adj Loss P
2 Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT V Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT V
3 N (100,25) Pot 90 Pot Quota Q N(100,30) Pot 90 Pot Quota Q
4
5 76.8792 77 90 76.88 77 1 91.6869 92 90 91.69 90 2
6 107.624 108 90 107.6 90 18 92.2649 92 90 93.11 90 2
7 104.845 105 90 113.7 90 15 82.6078 83 90 84.16 84 1
8 105.081 105 90 116.9 90 15 97.2848 97 90 97.28 90 7
9 84.4411 84 90 97.9 90 82.7299 83 90 86.37 86 1
10 109.644 110 90 113.6 90 20 111.002 111 90 111 90 21
11 62.993 63 90 74.79 75 1 132.481 132 90 143 90 42
12 134.508 135 90 134.5 90 45 105.081 105 90 131.6 90 15
13 71.3452 71 90 93.6 90 61.187 61 90 81.97 82 1
14 103.443 103 90 105.2 90 13 133.695 134 90 133.7 90 44
15 111.017 111 90 118.6 90 21 36.5911 37 90 58.44 58 1
16 130.673 131 90 145 90 41 43.5627 44 90 43.56 44 1
17 114.059 114 90 141.6 90 24 107.009 107 90 107 90 17
18 117.153 117 90 142.9 90 27 115.145 115 90 123.6 90 25
19 115.564 116 90 142 90 26 121.078 121 90 137.9 90 31
20 67.8579 68 90 93.87 90 121.36 121 90 145.3 90 31
21 117.685 118 90 119.6 90 28 119.347 119 90 147 90 29
22 151.007 151 90 165.8 90 61 106.036 106 90 134.5 90 16
23 118.979 119 90 156.9 90 29 39.7701 40 90 62.04 62 1
24 89.9776 90 90 123.4 90 96.5072 97 90 96.51 90 7
25 87.2418 87 90 104 90 97.1212 97 90 100.4 90 7
26 87.3266 87 90 94.3 90 83.6135 84 90 88.8 89 1
27 101.114 101 90 103.3 90 11 96.3455 96 90 96.35 90 6
28 73.3074 73 90 79.94 80 1 134.108 134 90 137.3 90 44
29 84.6818 85 90 84.68 85 1 132.872 133 90 156.5 90 43
30 54.088 54 90 54.09 54 1 124.167 124 90 157.4 90 34
31 90.6415 91 90 90.64 90 1 128.852 129 90 162.6 90 39
32 136.367 136 90 136.7 90 46 72.406 72 90 108.7 90
33 19.4988 19 90 42.84 43 1 92.9179 93 90 102.3 90 3
34 113.275 113 90 113.3 90 23 88.4393 88 90 94.57 90
35 95.5793 96 90 107.2 90 6 129.885 130 90 132.2 90 40
36 97.0181 97 90 105.6 90 7 84.7946 85 90 105.9 90
37 75.1989 75 90 83.01 83 1 139.155 139 90 147.1 90 49
38 53.4862 53 90 53.49 53 1 75.4464 75 90 104 90
39 144.565 145 90 144.6 90 55 81.2345 81 90 88.23 88 1
40 96.9449 97 90 124.2 90 7 142.477 142 90 142.5 90 52












APPENDIX C. SECOND MODEL RUN B
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Actual Int Adj Loss P Actual Int Adj Loss P
2 Rec. Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT vs Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT vs
3 Per. N(100,5) Pot 93 Pot Quota Q N(100,10 Pot 87 Pot Quota Q
4
5 1 98.499 98 93 98.5 93 5 106.215 106 87 106.22 87 19
6 2 93.612 94 93 96.36 93 1 95.4545 95 87 105.06 87 8
7 3 101.22 101 93 102.9 93 8 115.284 115 87 124.32 87 28
8 4 106.38 106 93 111.3 93 13 108.935 109 87 127.59 87 22
9 5 105.99 106 93 115.2 93 13 113.527 114 87 133.82 87 27
10 6 108.67 109 93 119.7 93 16 95.2363 95 87 118.65 87 8
11 7 89.082 89 93 102.5 93 110.063 110 87 125.89 87 23
12 8 98.829 99 93 103.6 93 6 82.0065 82 87 101.45 87
13 9 105.48 105 93 110.8 93 12 104.202 104 87 111.43 87 17
14 10 94.566 95 93 103.4 93 2 87.5419 88 87 99.755 87 1
15 11 96.549 97 93 101.8 93 4 99.365 99 87 105.74 87 12
16 12 91.548 92 93 95.93 93 107.02 107 87 116.39 87 20
17 13 90.765 91 93 92.23 92 1 107.821 108 87 122.52 87 21
18 14 95.112 95 93 95.11 93 2 98.845 99 87 116.6 87 12
19 15 96.132 96 93 97.19 93 3 102.312 102 87 117.11 87 15
20 16 89.41 89 93 91.5 92 1 85.9609 86 87 101.02 87
21 17 97.16 97 93 97.16 93 4 96.1975 96 87 103.21 87 9
22 18 97.98 98 93 100.1 93 5 100.002 100 87 108.11 87 13
23 19 100.67 101 93 104.2 93 8 88.915 89 87 99.468 87 2
24 20 98.173 98 93 103.8 93 5 102.35 102 87 108.58 87 15
25 21 98.365 98 93 103.8 93 5 110.324 110 87 121.12 87 23
26 22 98.149 98 93 103.5 93 5 100.943 101 87 118 87 14
27 23 106.71 107 93 112 93 14 100.752 101 87 116.25 87 14
28 24 99.574 100 93 109.1 93 7 102.305 102 87 116.93 87 15
29 25 99.069 99 93 107.1 93 6 89.8646 90 87 104.83 87 3
30 26 97.434 97 93 104.5 93 4 88.784 89 87 97.699 87 2
31 27 109.86 110 93 115.6 93 17 117.99 118 87 123.34 87 31
32 28 104.33 104 93 115.6 93 11 G 97.2154 97 87 115.39 87 10
33 29 111.88 112 93 123.2 93 19 92.339 92 87 106.53 87 5
34 30 96.725 97 93 111.8 93 4 92.8394 93 87 102.61 87 6
35 31 108.31 108 93 117.7 93 15 103.551 104 87 111.35 87 17
36 32 91.938 92 93 104.3 93 104.219 104 87 116.4 87 17
37 33 102.69 103 93 108.3 93 10 104.796 105 87 119.49 87 18
38 34 104.51 105 93 112.2 93 12 99.5788 100 87 115.83 87 13
39 35 109.59 110 93 119.2 93 17 101.618 102 87 116.03 87 15
40 36 99.577 100 93 112.7 93 7 91.6291 92 87 106.14 87 5
41 3596 3348 3346 260 2 3606 3132 3132 480
42
43
44 ColA = Recruiting Period ColH =Production vs Quota
45 ColB = Actual Market Potential C5 =ROUND(B5,0)
46 ColC = Integer of market Potential (Col B) D5 =Quota
47 ColD = Quota (value below it) E5 =IF(F4=ROUND(E4,0),B5,B5+(0.5*(E4-F4)))
48 ColE = Adjusted Market Potential F5 =IF(D5>E5,ROUND(E5,0),D5)
49 ColF = Production G5 =IF(ROUND(B5,0)-F5<0,0,ROUND(B5,0)-F5)
50 ColG = Loss Due To Quota H5 =IF(F5>=D5,0,1)
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APPENDIX C. SECOND MODEL RUN B
Q R S T U V W Y Z AA AB AC AD AE
1 Actual Int Adj Loss P Actual Int Adj Loss P
2 Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod Due To vs Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT vs
3 N(100,15) Pot 80 Pot Quota Q N(100,20) Pot 74 Pot Quota Q
4
5 76.1774 76 80 76.18 76 1 125.854 126 74 125.85 74 52
6 97.1527 97 80 97.15 80 17 74.2373 74 74 100.16 74
7 90.0509 90 80 98.63 80 10 108.814 109 74 121.9 74 35
8 101.318 101 80 110.6 80 21 86.2793 86 74 110.23 74 12
9 85.7662 86 80 101.1 80 6 118.044 118 74 136.16 74 44
10 127.473 127 80 138 80 47 83.3448 83 74 114.42 74 9
11 101.153 101 80 130.2 80 21 88.3545 88 74 108.57 74 14
12 92.2796 92 80 117.4 80 12 87.4636 87 74 104.75 74 13
13 84.3014 84 80 103 80 4 93.8464 94 74 109.22 74 20
14 125.092 125 80 136.6 80 45 79.8845 80 74 97.494 74 6
15 101.744 102 80 130 80 22 141.813 142 74 153.56 74 68
16 85.7031 86 80 110.7 80 6 141.544 142 74 181.32 74 68
17 91.7694 92 80 107.1 80 12 84.4637 84 74 138.13 74 10
18 114.2 114 80 127.8 80 34 91.6076 92 74 123.67 74 18
19 95.2667 95 80 119.1 80 15 93.4295 93 74 118.26 74 19
20 86.4274 86 80 106 80 6 132.22 132 74 154.35 74 58
21 83.8006 84 80 96.8 80 4 79.2056 79 74 119.38 74 5
22 97.9946 98 80 106.4 80 18 93.9041 94 74 116.59 74 20
23 102.285 102 80 115.5 80 22 116.483 116 74 137.78 74 42
24 119.946 120 80 137.7 80 40 120.539 121 74 152.43 74 47
25 121.85 122 80 150.7 80 42 96.8002 97 74 136.01 74 23
26 112.527 113 80 147.9 80 33 56.8761 57 74 87.883 74
27 102.132 102 80 136.1 80 22 144.219 144 74 151.16 74 70
28 87.4842 87 80 115.5 80 7 84.4285 84 74 123.01 74 10
29 119.707 120 80 137.5 80 40 115.619 116 74 140.12 74 42
30 85.6433 86 80 114.4 80 6 112.399 112 74 145.46 74 38
31 117.045 117 80 134.2 80 37 82.4067 82 74 118.14 74 8
32 122.311 122 80 149.4 80 42 109.977 110 74 132.05 74 36
33 112.607 113 80 147.3 80 33 109.91 110 74 138.93 74 36
34 119.653 120 80 153.3 80 40 90.3953 90 74 122.86 74 16
35 96.6969 97 80 133.4 80 17 109.091 109 74 133.52 74 35
36 76.6898 77 80 103.4 80 71.4762 71 74 101.24 74
37 86.2153 86 80 97.9 80 6 92.646 93 74 106.26 74 19
38 96.9281 97 80 105.9 80 17 115.592 116 74 131.72 74 42
39 78.1863 78 80 91.12 80 68.3548 68 74 97.217 74
40 149.2 149 80 154.8 80 69 65.6089 66 74 77.217 74











APPENDIX C. SECOND MODEL RUN B
AF AG AH Al AJ AK AL AN AO AP AQ AR AS AT
1 Actual Int Adj Loss P Actual Int Adj Loss P
2 Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod Due To vs Mkt Pot Mkt Q Mkt Prod DueT vs
3 N(100,25) Pot 68 Pot Quota Q N(100,30 Pot 61 Pot Quota Q
4
5 76.8792 77 68 76.88 68 9 91.6869 92 61 91.687 61 31
6 107.624 108 68 112.1 68 40 92.2649 92 61 107.61 61 31
7 104.845 105 68 126.9 68 37 82.6078 83 61 105.91 61 22
8 105.081 105 68 134.5 68 37 97.2848 97 61 119.74 61 36
9 84.4411 84 68 117.7 68 16 82.7299 83 61 112.1 61 22
10 109.644 110 68 134.5 68 42 111.002 111 61 136.55 61 50
11 62.993 63 68 96.24 68 132.481 132 61 170.26 61 71
12 134.508 135 68 148.6 68 67 105.081 105 61 159.71 61 44
13 71.3452 71 68 111.7 68 3 61.187 61 61 110.54 61
14 103.443 103 68 125.3 68 35 133.695 134 61 158.47 61 73
15 111.017 111 68 139.7 68 43 36.5911 37 61 85.324 61
16 130.673 131 68 166.5 68 63 43.5627 44 61 55.725 56 1
17 114.059 114 68 163.3 68 46 107.009 107 61 107.01 61 46
18 117.153 117 68 164.8 68 49 115.145 115 61 138.15 61 54
19 115.564 116 68 164 68 48 121.078 121 61 159.65 61 60
20 67.8579 68 68 115.8 68 121.36 121 61 170.69 61 60
21 117.685 118 68 141.6 68 50 o 119.347 119 61 174.19 61 58
22 151.007 151 68 187.8 68 83 106.036 106 61 162.63 61 45
23 118.979 119 68 178.9 68 51 39.7701 40 61 90.586 61
24 89.9776 90 68 145.4 68 22 96.5072 97 61 111.3 61 36
25 87.2418 87 68 126 68 19 97.1212 97 61 122.27 61 36
26 87.3266 87 68 116.3 68 19 83.6135 84 61 114.25 61 23
27 101.114 101 68 125.3 68 33 96.3455 96 61 122.97 61 35
28 73.3074 73 68 101.9 68 5 134.108 134 61 165.09 61 73
29 84.6818 85 68 101.7 68 17 132.872 133 61 184.92 61 72
30 54.088 54 68 70.91 68 124.167 124 61 186.13 61 63
31 90.6415 91 68 92.1 68 23 128.852 129 61 191.41 61 68
32 136.367 136 68 148.4 68 68 72.406 72 61 137.61 61 11
33 19.4988 19 68 59.71 60 1 92.9179 93 61 131.22 61 32
34 113.275 113 68 113.3 68 45 88.4393 88 61 123.55 61 27
35 95.5793 96 68 118.2 68 28 129.885 130 61 161.16 61 69
36 97.0181 97 68 122.1 68 29 84.7946 85 61 134.88 61 24
37 75.1989 75 68 102.3 68 7 139.155 139 61 176.09 61 78
38 53.4862 53 68 7062 68 75.4464 75 61 132.99 61 14
39 144.565 145 68 145.9 68 77 81.2345 81 61 117.23 61 20
40 96.9449 97 68 135.9 68 29 142.477 142 61 170.59 61 81
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